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 Get The Best of Both Worlds: Illusory 
Arbitration Agreements 
Druco Rests., Inc. v. Steak N Shake Enters., 765 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2014). 
DESIREE SHAY* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In general, arbitration provisions have become increasingly popular in con-
tracts between a larger party and a smaller, less-powerful party.  However, these 
contracts have also given rise to a significant amount of litigation due to the con-
tracts being unenforceable and unconscionable.  At times, significant oddities in 
these agreements result in some curious results in the court system – whether this 
arises from oversight or something else is unclear. 
This Note addresses the clauses in franchise-franchisee agreements that pre-
serve the right for a franchisor to unilaterally alter the terms of arbitration after the 
franchise relationship has begun.  A majority of courts, applying state contract 
law, have held that these clauses are unenforceable due to a lack of consideration, 
making the contract  illusory.1  However, courts still come to different conclusions 
because each court has to follow state contract law.2  The United States Supreme 
Court’s holding on this issue might not be able to have full effect because the 
Federal Arbitration Act requires that courts rely on state law.3  The Seventh Cir-
cuit’s decision in Druco further throws a twist into the circuit decisions because of 
the franchisor’s decision to make arbitration non-binding, a factor that was not 
present in many other courts.4 
Additionally, this Note will cover illusory arbitration agreements resulting 
from the unconscionability of unilateral contracts.  Under this idea, this Note will 
discuss the concept of a minimum 30-day notification in an arbitration clause that 
would allow franchisors the ability to implement arbitration agreements at a later 
date, but also provide protection for the party with less power.  Further, the com-
ment section will explore binding and nonbinding arbitration and the idea that 
courts should treat them differently in franchise agreements.  Interestingly, non-
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 1. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 517 F.3d 248, 257 (5th Cir. 2008).  See generally, Druco Rests., Inc. 
v. Steak N Shake Enters., 765 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 2. See generally Michael L. DeMichele & Richard A. Bales, Unilateral-Modification Provisions in 
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 63 (2006). 
 3. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). 
 4. See, Druco, 765 F.3d at 776. 
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binding and binding arbitration are treated the same for purposes of a presumption 
of arbitration – even though they are different in every other aspect. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
Often contracts are signed without thorough thought as to the ramification of 
certain clauses.  In regard to the instant decision, the issue arose over whether a 
franchisor could implement an arbitration policy retroactively to prevent the mat-
ter from going to court.5  Three franchisees, Druco Restaurants, Inc., People Sales 
& Profit Company, Inc., and Scott’s S&S Inc., brought lawsuits to dispel an 
agreement about price fixing by the franchisor.6  Steak n Shake then filed a mo-
tion to stay, claiming that an arbitration clause was controlling.7 
A. The Franchise Agreements 
Prior to 2005, Steak n Shake granted franchise rights to other organizations 
for operation of its restaurants.8  Druco Restaurants, Inc. (Druco) operated two of 
these franchises in Missouri, People Sales & Profit Company, Inc. (PSPC) operat-
ed five in Georgia, and Scott’s S&S Inc. (Scott) operated one location in Pennsyl-
vania.9  All three of the franchise agreements included language about Steak n 
Shake reserving the right to implement a nonbinding arbitration clause.10 
Druco owned and operated two franchises in Missouri since 1989.11  PSPC 
originally signed four franchise agreements, and later obtained a fifth, known as 
the Brunswick Agreement,12 from another franchisee.13  Further, Scott had a fran-
chise agreement in Pennsylvania.14 
                                                          
 5. Id. at 784. 
 6. Id. at 778-79. 
 7. Id. at 779. 
 8. Id. at 778. 
 9. Id. at 778. 
 10. Druco, 765 F.3d  at 779-80. Though parts of the contract language differed, both contracts 
included the following statement:  
The Company reserves the right to institute at any time a system of nonbinding arbitration or 
mediation. Any arbitration under this Agreement shall be held in a forum in the City of Indian-
apolis, State of Indiana. The Franchisee will be obligated to participate in such system, at the 
Company’s request, in the event of a dispute. The Federal Arbitration Act applies to the arbitra-
tion forum clauses contained in this agreement.  
Id. 
 11. Druco Rests. v. Steak N Shake Enters., 2013 WL 5779646, *1 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 9, 2013) [hereinaf-
ter Druco Rests.]. 
 12. Druco 765 F.3d at 779.  The court noted that there was “no language implicating arbitration” in 
the Brunswick Agreement, so there was no basis to compel or stay arbitration based on this franchisee 
agreement. Id. at 779. 
 13. Druco, 765 F.3d at 778. 
 14. Druco Rests., 2013 WL 5779646, at *1. 
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B. The Corporate Change and Lawsuits 
Prior to 2010, franchisees of Steak n Shake had the freedom to set their own 
menu prices and the option to participate in corporate pricing promotions.15  The 
only requirement of the franchisees was that they comply with the Steak n Shake 
“System,” though this term did not require conforming to recommended menu 
prices.16  Following a corporate takeover, Steak n Shake began implementing the 
same pricing and corporate promotions for all of the franchisees, in effect control-
ling their revenues and promotions, known as the Menu Pricing and Promotion 
Policy (Policy).17 
As the franchisees saw decreases in their revenue, they opted to bring suit in 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis 
Division, seeking a declaratory judgment of their right to control pricing and pro-
motions.18  Due to language in the contracts that allowed Steak n Shake the unilat-
eral right to amend the arbitration policy, an arbitration policy was adopted by 
Steak n Shake on May 1, 2013, after the suits had been filed.19 
The arbitration policy effectively required franchisees to participate in non-
binding arbitration upon Steak n Shake’s request.20  Following this policy, Steak n 
Shake then filed an order compelling nonbinding arbitration of the franchisees’ 
lawsuits and moved to stay the lawsuits on May 22, 2013.21  Steak n Shake sought 
to stay the litigation on the Brunswick Agreement only until the other contracts 
were determined by arbitration.22  Because the ruling for Steak n Shake was much 
the same in all three suits, the district court consolidated its ruling and opinion on 
the motion to stay filed by Steak n Shake.23  The district court went through each 
agreement, stating why arbitration could not be compelled.24  The Brunswick 
agreement was determined to never even have language referencing the arbitration 
clause, so the court determined that arbitration simply could not be enforced on 
that agreement.25  For the remaining agreements, it was determined that the arbi-
tration agreement was illusory because Steak n Shake retained a unilateral right to 
amend the arbitration agreement.26  The court further stated that had the contracts 
not been illusory, they would not have been enforceable because the events in 
                                                          
 15. Druco, 765 F.3d at 778-79.  The franchise agreements provided that “[f]ranchisees are free to set 
consumer prices different from prices on company-owned restaurant menus.” Druco Rests., 2013 WL 
5779646, at *1 (citations omitted). 
 16. Druco Rests., 2013 WL 5779646, at *1. 
 17. Druco, 765 F.3d at 779. Franchisees were also required to acquire products from a distributor 
that Steak n Shake negotiated the prices for. Id.  The “Policy” states, “All restaurants are required to 
follow set company menu and pricing as published with the exception of breakfast items. Addition-
al[ly], all restaurants are required to offer all company promotions as published.” Druco Rests., 2013 
WL 5779646, at *2 (citations omitted). 
 18. Druco, 765 F.3d at 779. 
 19. Id. The new clauses stated: “this policy does not represent a change, but is merely implementing 
a right previously reserved by the Company in certain of its franchise agreements.” Druco Rests., 2013 
WL 5779646, at *3 (citations omitted). 
 20. Druco, 765 F.3d at 779. 
 21. Id. at 779; Druco Rests., 2013 WL 5779646, at *4. 
 22. Druco, 765 F.3d at 781.   The contract in the Brunswick Agreement did not withhold the right 
for Steak n Shake to add an arbitration clause. Id. at 779. 
 23. Druco Rests., 2013 WL 5779646, at *1. 
 24. Id. at *5. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Druco, 765 F.3d at 779. 
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question in the lawsuit occurred before Steak n Shake attempted to implement the 
arbitration policy.27  It went on to state that because the arbitration was nonbind-
ing, the clauses in no way implemented an agreement to settle by arbitration, so 
they could not be enforced under the FAA.28  Steak n Shake appealed from the 
district court’s decision.29 
The central issue on appeal involved the rights of a franchisor to compel fran-
chisees to arbitration after the franchisees have filed a claim in federal court.30  
The Seventh Circuit ultimately agreed with the district court,31 holding that the 
arbitration agreement was illusory because no language in the contract prevented 
Steak n Shake from altering the arbitration system or completely deleting the pro-
vision.32  This type of agreement was illusory under Indiana law because it left the 
agreement entirely optional to the promisor.33  Further, the agreement was unen-
forceable because the clauses were vague and indefinite in that they gave Steak n 
Shake sole discretion over the details of arbitration.34  The Seventh Circuit there-
fore held that the district court’s denial of the motion to stay litigation was appro-
priate.35 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Arbitration and Contractual Background 
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governs any arbitration agreement that is 
“a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.”36  The language of the 
FAA created a federal policy favoring arbitration.37  This policy means that arbi-
tration agreements are as enforceable as other contracts and no particular clause is 
weighted more than the rest.38  Due to this policy favoring arbitration, when courts 
review the claims for arbitration, they must apply a “presumption of arbitrability” 
if the arbitration agreement at hand is not ambiguous as to whether arbitration 
governs the dispute.39  When parties argue that the language is ambiguous, there is 
no presumption of arbitration.40  If the language is clear, the plaintiff has to prove 
                                                          
 27. Druco Rests., 2013 WL 5779646, at *6. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Druco, 765 F.3d at 779. 
 30. Id. at 778. 
 31. Id. at 784. 
 32. Id. at 783-84. 
 33. Id. at 783. 
 34. Id. at 784. 
 35. Druco, 765 F.3d at 784. 
 36. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012); Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 
(1995). (“[Section 2 of the FAA] makes enforceable a written arbitration provision in ‘a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce.’”) (emphasis added). 
 37. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011); see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) 
(“A written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevo-
cable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”). 
 38. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967). 
 39. Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd.of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 301 (2010). However, courts should 
only apply this presumption when it is clear that the parties intended to arbitrate the dispute. Id. 
 40. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995) (At most, the choice-of-
law clause introduces an ambiguity into an arbitration agreement that would otherwise allow punitive 
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that the arbitration agreement is illusory or unconscionable to rebut the presump-
tion of arbitration.41 
The appropriate forum for whether a valid arbitration clause exists is the dis-
trict court – not arbitration.42  When a party brings a petition regarding failure to 
arbitrate or to enjoin arbitration, the party can bring the petition in any United 
States court, federal or state, that would have jurisdiction in a civil action if no 
arbitration agreement was in place.43  Courts should apply the same state law that 
governs the contract between the parties.44  As a result, arbitration agreements can 
be invalidated by “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability.”45 
For a party to compel arbitration, the Seventh Circuit held that a party needs 
only to show three elements: “(1) an agreement to arbitrate, (2) a dispute within 
the scope of the arbitration agreement, and (3) a refusal by the opposing party to 
proceed to arbitration.”46  However, arbitration cannot be compelled if the matter 
to be arbitrated is a dispute that one party did not agree to arbitrate in the con-
tract.47  Further, Indiana law states that “[w]hether the parties agreed to arbitrate 
any disputes is a matter of contract interpretation, and most importantly, a matter 
of the parties’ intent.”48  When determining the intent of the parties, courts should 
look to the language of the contract when the contract was signed.49 
When performance is “entirely optional” for one party and not available for 
another party, the courts can find the agreement to be an illusory promise.50  The 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts says that “[w]ords of promise which by their 
terms make performance entirely optional with the ‘promisor’ whatever may hap-
pen, or whatever course of conduct in other respects he may pursue, do not consti-
                                                          
damages awards. As we pointed out in Volt, when a court interprets such provisions in an agreement 
covered by the FAA, “due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambigui-
ties as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.”). 
 41. Applied Energetics, Inc. v. NewOak Capital Mkts., LLC, 645 F.3d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 2011) (This 
is inferred from the language of this case, “presumption in favor of arbitrability should only be applied 
‘where a validly formed and enforceable arbitration agreement is ambiguous about whether it covers 
the dispute at hand’ . . . while doubts concerning the scope of an arbitration clause should be resolved 
in favor of arbitration, the presumption does not apply to disputes concerning whether an agreement to 
arbitrate has been made.”) (citations omitted). 
 42. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 652 (1986). (“Unless the 
parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to 
arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.”). 
 43. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). 
 44. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). This concept is also stated in 
section 2 of the FAA, which expressly states that the basis for the enforcement or revocation of arbitra-
tion agreements shall come from state contract law. DeMichele & Bales, supra note 2, at 67. 
 45. Rent-A-Ctr, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010) (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v Casa-
rotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)). 
 46. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Watts Indus., Inc., 466 F. 3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 47. AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 648. 
 48. MPACT Constr. Grp., LLC v. Superior Concrete Constructors, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 901, 906 (Ind. 
2004). 
 49. Wolvos v. Meyer, 668 N.E.2d 671, 675 n.1 (Ind. 1996) ); see also Brockmann v. Brockmann, 
938 N.E.2d 831, 834-35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (determining that the terms of a contract will be given 
their “plain and ordinary meaning,” unless it is determined that the language in the contract is ambigu-
ous). 
 50. Druco Rests., Inc. v. Steak N Shake Enters., 765 F.3d 776, 782 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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tute a promise.”51  Illusory promises are unenforceable and cannot form a valid 
contract when one party is not obligated to do anything.52 
B. Other Circuit Backgrounds on Illusory Promises 
Multiple circuits have held that arbitration clauses can be considered illusory 
promises in part for insufficient definiteness.53  In the Seventh Circuit case, Penn 
v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, an employer, Ryan’s Family Steak Houses 
(Ryan’s), had an employee, Penn, sign an arbitration document with Employment 
Dispute Services (EDS),54 a third party that contracted with Ryan’s “to provide an 
arbitration forum for all employment-related disputes.”55  The Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s ruling that the arbitration agreement, if enforced, 
would create an atmosphere that was overly biased towards Ryan’s, which had 
selected and hired the arbitrators.56 
The Seventh Circuit went on to say that the agreement between EDS and 
Penn included an illusory promise on the part of EDS because the agreement did 
not set out any details about the standards to be used for arbitration or the nature 
of the forum to be used.57  In contrast, Penn’s obligations to EDS and Ryan’s un-
der the agreement detailed what the agreement covered and how long Penn was 
required to adhere to those obligations.58  Penn was given rules promulgated by 
EDS, but the agreement was still illusory because the rules stated that EDS could 
modify or amend them without Penn’s consent.59  The court held that the contract 
was “hopelessly vague,” because of these factors.60 
In a factually similar case to Druco, the Fifth Circuit held in Morrison v. Am-
way Corp. that when a party attempting to enforce an arbitration clause retains a 
unilateral right to amend the arbitration clause, the contract is illusory and unen-
forceable.61  This includes eliminating arbitration entirely or simply restricting the 
claims and disputes for which arbitration could be used.62  In Morrison, the seller, 
Amway, wanted to enforce an arbitration agreement when a dispute arose with the 
distributors.63  However, the dispute at issue arose before the arbitration require-
ment was included in the agreements and only occurred when Amway amended 
                                                          
 51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 cmt. e. (AM. LAW INST. 1981). The Restatement 
continues by saying: “Although such words are often referred to as forming an illusory promise, they 
do not fall within the present definition of promise. … Even if a present intention is manifested, the 
reservation of an option to change that intention means that there can be no promise who is justified in 
an expectation of performance.” Id. 
 52. Penn v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, 269 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 
 53. See Id. at 753; Morrison v. Amway Corp., 517 F.3d 248, 255 (5th Cir. 2008); Floss v. Ryan’s 
Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 206 (6th Cir. 2000); Dumais v. American Golf Corp., 299 F.3d 
1216 (10th Cir. 2002) (Cases all state, in one form or another, that when a party retains the unilateral 
and unresitrcited rights to amend an arbitration agreement, that it is going to be considered illusory 
because it is considered indefinite). 
 54. EDS is a third party company that provides arbitration services.  Penn, 269 F.3d at 755. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 759. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 759-60. 
 60. Penn, 269 F.3d at 760. 
 61. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 517 F.3d 248, 257 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 253. 
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its Rules of Conduct.64  The contracts contained a provision that allowed Amway 
to make any amendment regarding arbitration.65  After the distributors attempted 
on two occasions to sue Amway, Amway filed motions to stay the litigation pend-
ing arbitration, and both courts granted Amway’s motions.66 
The parties went to arbitration, but no party was successful on its claims and 
the arbitrator gave no explanation for this result.67  Subsequently, the distributors 
moved for the district court to vacate the arbitration fees, alleging the arbitration 
clauses were not valid.68  The district court denied this motion and the distributors 
appealed to the Fifth Circuit.69 
When analyzing Amway’s Rules of Conduct for 1998, the Fifth Circuit stated 
that nothing in the language suggested that the arbitration amendment would not 
apply to the events occurring before adoption of the 1998 Rules.70  The court fur-
ther stated that the Rules did not prevent Amway from unilaterally modifying 
arbitration provisions.71  Because of this unilateral right, the arbitration agreement 
was an illusory agreement and could not be upheld.72  The Fifth Circuit stated that 
Amway could have saved its arbitration clause by including what the court called 
a “Halliburton type savings clause,” which was based off of Halliburton’s contract 
which provided that the company could not unilaterally amend the contract to get 
out of a certain dispute and that an amendment would only apply prospectively.73  
The arbitration agreement, however, did not include such a clause and there was 
no obligation on behalf of Amway.74  The arbitration agreement was illusory and 
unenforceable against the distributors concerning the disputes that arose before the 
implemented arbitration clause.75 
Druco is very factually similar to Morrison, which was decided by the Fifth 
Circuit.  Druco involved a franchisee, and Morrison involved a distributor.  How-
                                                          
 64. Id. at 250-51. When distributor agreed to sell Amway products, they agreed to abide by Am-
way’s Code of Ethics and Rules of Conduct, including any amendments that occurred to the Code.  Id.  
The Code had to be renewed on a yearly basis.  Id. at 250. 
 65. Id. at 250-51. 
 66. Id. at 251-52. 
 67. Morrison, 517 F.3d at 252-53. 
 68. Id. at 253. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 254. The 1998 annual contract stated: 
[T]o conduct [his or her] business according to the Amway Code of Ethics and Rules of Conduct, 
as they are amended and published from time to time in official Amway literature. … I agree I 
will give notice in writing of any claim or dispute arising out of or relating to my Amway dis-
tributorship, or the Amway Sales and Marketing Plan or Rules of Conduct to the other party or 
parties … I will then try in good faith to resolve the dispute using the Amway Conciliation and 
Enforcement Procedures contained in the Rules of Conduct for Amway Distributors. If the claim 
or dispute is not resolved to [his or her] satisfaction within 80 days, or after the Amway Concilia-
tion process is complete, whichever is later, I agree to submit any remaining claim or dispute 
arising out of or relating to any Amway distributorship, the Amway Sales and Marketing Plan, or 
the Amway Rules of Conduct … to binding arbitration in accordance with the Amway Arbitra-
tion rules, which are set forth in the Amway Business Compendium.” 
 71. Id. 
 72. Morrison, 517 F.3d at 255, 257. 
 73. Id. at 255, 257; see also In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 569-70 (Tex. 2002). The court 
determined that this meant that Halliburton had an obligation to act and the provision was not consid-
ered illusory. Id. 
 74. Morrison, 517 F.3d at 257-58. 
 75. Id. 
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ever, both cases involved parties that brought suit against the promisor.76  Though 
the facts of why the disputes arose are different, both promisors attempted to en-
force arbitration clauses that were not introduced into the agreements until after 
the disputes at issue arose.77  Both courts ultimately held that an arbitration con-
tract that is based on unilateral power by the promisor creates an illusory and un-
enforceable contract.78 
In Penn, the Seventh Circuit held that when a performance by the promisor is 
completely optional, the contract becomes illusory and is therefore invalid.79  Oth-
er circuits have also held that an arbitration clause is considered illusory and unen-
forceable when there is a unilateral right to amend by the party seeking enforce-
ment.80 
The Tenth Circuit81 and the Sixth Circuit82 have also made similar rulings and 
have joined the other circuits in holding that “an arbitration agreement allowing 
one party the unfettered right to alter the arbitration agreement’s existence or its 
scope is illusory.”83  The Fourth Circuit has stated that secondary contracts should 
not be looked at and only the language in the arbitration clause should be consid-
ered in determining whether the arbitration clause is illusory.84 
C. Nonbinding Arbitration 
In nonbinding arbitration, the arbitrator’s decision is ultimately not final.85  
Parties that participate in nonbinding arbitration treat the decision given by the 
arbitrator as an “independent assessment” of the potential lawsuit, identifying both 
weaknesses and strengths, with the hope those parties will be more likely to settle 
than take the financial burden of a lawsuit.86  In binding arbitration, the arbitra-
tor’s decision will rarely be overturned, and typically is only overturned when 
some sort of fraud is involved.87 
Some states have gone as far as giving nonbinding arbitration the same au-
thority and weight as binding arbitration under the FAA and similar provisions.  
The New York Court of Appeals, in Board of Education v. Cracovia, held that 
nonbinding arbitration is to be given the authority under the New York Arbitration 
                                                          
 76. Id. at 251; Druco Rests., Inc. v. Steak N Shake Enters., 765 F.3d 776, 779 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 77. Morrison, 517 F.3d at 251-252 (The dispute at the heart of this case arose in June 1997. In 
September 1997, Amway announced the amendment of the arbitration agreement. On January 8, 1998, 
Morrison brought suit for the incident in June 1997. Amway attempted to argue that the arbitration 
clause would retroactively apply to the incident.) ; Druco, 765 F.3d at 779. 
 78. Morrison, 517 F.3d at 257; Druco, 765 F.3d at 784-85. 
 79. Penn v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, 269 F.3d 753, 759-760 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 80. Druco, 765 F.3d at 784-85. Morrison, 517 F.3d at 257; Dumais v. Am. Golf Corp., 299 F.3d 
1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2002); Floss v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 316 (6th Cir. 
2000). 
 81. See Dumais v. American Golf Corp., 299 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2002).  
 82. See Floss, 211 F.3d 206; Morrison, 317 F.3d 646. 
 83. Druco, 765 F.3d at 783. See Floss, 211 F.3d at 316 (“EDSI has reserved the right to alter the 
applicable rules and procedures without any obligation to notify, much less receive consent from, Floss 
and Daniels. EDSI’s right to choose the nature of its performance renders its promise illusory.”). 
 84. Hill v. Peoplesoft USA, Inc., 412 F.3d 540, 544 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 85. See Barbara Kate Repa, Arbitration Basics, NOLO LAW FOR ALL, http://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/arbitration-basics-29947.html (last visited April 29, 2015) 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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Act as binding arbitration.88  The court reasoned that the desire for courts to favor 
arbitration is not altered by nonbinding arbitration agreements.89  The New York 
Arbitration Act was the model for the FAA,90 and because the New York Arbitra-
tion Act served as the model for the drafters of the FAA, the court decisions inter-
preting the New York Act are strongly persuasive for purposes of construing the 
FAA.91 
D. Enforceable Agreement 
To be enforceable, a contract must be adequately certain and define essential 
terms in order for courts to determine if and when a contract has been per-
formed.92  Consequently, a contract that is merely “an agreement to make an 
agreement” will be considered illusory and unenforceable under Indiana state 
law.93  Regardless, such option contracts can be enforceable.94  The difference 
between the two types of contracts has to do with the intent of the parties to be 
bound and the definiteness of terms.95 
Courts require definiteness of terms in option contracts because treating an 
ambiguous writing as enforceable would create the danger of enforcing the words 
in a manner the parties did not intend.96  The test Indiana courts have used looks to 
the important terms and analyzes whether they were vague and uncertain or defi-
nite in their meaning.97  Then the court looks to see if the essential terms in the 
contract were precise to the point that neither party could misconstrue them.98  
Any agreement that allows a party to reserve the right to implement arbitration is 
going to be considered vague and unenforceable under Indiana law.99 
The FAA is the governing law most often used for arbitration and it has cre-
ated a federal policy favoring arbitration.100  However, a problem appears when 
the clause reserves the right for unilateral amendment resulting in an illusory 
promise.101  However, these clauses may be saved by the Halliburton type savings 
                                                          
 88. Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Cracovia, 36 A.D. 2d 851. (N.Y. App. Div. 1971). 
 89. Id. (“‘A written agreement to submit any controversy ... is enforceable without regard to the 
justiciable character of the controversy.’ We can see no compelling reason why article 75 of the CPLR 
should not be applicable to ‘advisory arbitration’ if that is what the parties intended. Arbitration is a 
creature of contract and its scope can be very broad or very narrow, depending on the provisions of the 
contract. At bar, the parties have agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration although additionally 
agreeing to limit the impact of the arbitrator’s award to that of merely an advisory nature in some 
instances.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 90. See S. Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong. 1st Sess. 3 (1924). 
 91. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
575-79 (Thomas Reuters et al eds., 2012). 
 92. Cty Dep’t of Public Welfare v. Ind. Council 62, Am. Fed’n of State, Cty & Mun. Emp., 416 
N.E.2d 153, 156 (Ind. App. 1981). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Wolvos v. Meyer, 668 N.E.2d 671, 678 (Ind. 1996). 
 95. Id. at 675. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 674-75. 
 100. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011); 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 101. Druco Rests., Inc. v. Steak N Shake Enters., 765 F.3d 776, 782 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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clause.102  The final oddity in these agreements is when the parties implement 
nonbinding arbitration, meaning that the arbitrator’s decision will not be deemed 
final.103 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
In Druco, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals relied on case law from Indi-
ana state courts and other federal circuit courts to determine whether an arbitration 
agreement existed.104  The Seventh Circuit began by determining the weight to be 
given to the FAA.105  Then, the court examined the contract and agreement under 
Indiana state law.106  Both parties stipulated that Indiana law applied to all of the 
franchise agreements.107  The court concluded by examining whether the agree-
ment was an illusory promise.108 
Steak n Shake argued that the court must give weight in favor of arbitration 
because of the federal policy favoring arbitration.109  However, in order for a con-
tract to be enforceable, both parties must have agreed to the terms.110  Federal and 
state courts accept the idea that the policy in favor of arbitration only applies when 
the scope of an arbitration agreement is questioned.111  To determine the breadth 
of requirements for the contract to be enforceable, the court had to consider Indi-
ana state law.112 
Indiana law required the court to consider the intent of the parties at the time 
they entered into the contract.113  During oral arguments, Steak n Shake admitted 
that none of the franchise agreements included the language used in the later-
implemented arbitration policy, but rather used language to create an option.114  
However, the franchise agreements did state that it was necessary for disputes to 
be brought in competent jurisdictions.115 
The district court found that the arbitration clauses in the franchise agreement 
were illusory because performance by Steak n Shake was “entirely optional.”116  
The court reasoned that because Steak n Shake retained the right to implement the 
arbitration clause, it also retained the power to control the “circumstances and 
                                                          
 102. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 517 F.3d 248, 257 (5th Cir. 2008); in re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 
566, 569-70 (Tex. 2002) 
 103. See Repa, supra note 86. 
 104. Druco, 765 F.3d at 782-83. 
 105. Id. at 781. 
 106. Id. at 782. 
 107. Id. at 781. 
 108. Id. at 782-83. 
 109. Id. at 781. 
 110. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U. S. 643, 648 (1986). 
 111. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995) (However, when it is due 
to ambiguous provisions in the arbitration agreement, courts should give more weight towards arbitra-
tion.). 
 112. Druco, 765 F.3d at 781. Indiana state law must be considered in reading the arbitration agree-
ment “without giving any special consideration to the federal policy favoring arbitration.” Id. at 781-
82. 
 113. Id. at 782. 
 114. Id. The specific language used stated “reserve[ing] the right to institute at any time a system of 
nonbinding arbitration[.]” Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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procedures” for when arbitration would occur.117  As the power to perform re-
mained with the promisor, the arbitration clause was illusory under Indiana law.118  
Further, as Steak n Shake retained the power to control the details of any arbitra-
tion that occurred, including applying the arbitration clause retroactively to a dis-
pute that was already being litigated in court, the arbitration clause was “vague 
and indefinite” and could not be enforced under Indiana state law. 119 
V. COMMENT 
Contracts containing arbitration clauses have been highly litigated and every 
court system has created slightly different caselaw on this issue.  This comment 
will focus on conscionability, unilateral agreements, and nonbinding arbitration.  
This comment discusses whether a franchise120 can enforce a contract that reserves 
the right to implement an arbitration policy after an initial contract, without the 
clause being unconscionable or the contract being a unilateral agreement.  Next, 
this comment will explore the concept of courts not differentiating between bind-
ing and nonbinding arbitration and how this seems counterintuitive to the concept 
of nonbinding arbitration.  Ultimately, it would be in the best interest of parties 
with less bargaining power to have a notification requirement before an arbitration 
clause is implemented.  A little more unsteady is the idea of nonbinding arbitra-
tion enforcement, although enforcing nonbinding arbitration makes little sense. 
A. Conscionability and Unilateral Agreements 
When something is unconscionable, it refers to some portion of a contract be-
ing so incredibly harsh that it would be exceedingly unfair for the courts to en-
force the contract as is.121  Often, a clause will be considered unconscionable 
when there is a unilateral agreement to amend, meaning that one party reserves the 
sole right to change the language.122 
The courts appear to be split on what unilateral-modification clauses mean for 
the enforceability of the contract between the franchisor and franchisee.  Many 
courts refuse to enforce the clauses based on the contract having no consideration, 
an illusory promise, indefiniteness, or unconscionability, while other courts refuse 
to enforce the clauses because such agreements would allow employers to alter 
rules or clauses after a dispute has arisen.123  Unfortunately, some courts, even if 
they are a minority, will enforce these types of arbitration clauses, resulting in a 
further disadvantage for franchisees in the bargaining process.124 
                                                          
 117. Id. at 783. 
 118. Druco, 765 F.3d at 783. 
 119. Id. at 784. 
 120. Franchise refers to the over arching corporate entity for the restaurant. Franchisee refers to the 
individual parties running store locations. 
 121. See Unconscionable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 122. See Unilateral, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (meaning “[o]ne-sided; relating to 
only one of two or more persons or things”).  
 123. DeMichele & Bales, supra note 2, at 64-65. 
 124. Id. at 64. See Hill v. Peoplesoft USA, Inc., 412 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2005) (Shows a court that 
enforced an arbitration clause that had a unilateral-modification clause). 
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As is clear from the outcome in Druco, franchisors need to use clear language 
that does not give them unilateral power to amend an arbitration clause.125  The 
Fifth Circuit and Texas state courts within that circuit have suggested that provid-
ing a “savings clause”126 and a time frame before the implementation or dissolu-
tion of an arbitration clause is final would save the arbitration clause from being 
illusory.127 
However, in Druco, the Seventh Circuit also pointed to the fact that the arbi-
tration clause, reserving the right to amend the clause, did not contain the terms of 
what would be included in the arbitration clause to be adopted.128  The Court also 
relied heavily on the idea that Steak n Shake was never obliged to adopt the arbi-
tration policy and could ignore the provision in the contract.129  This seems to 
suggest that, under Indiana law, courts will be required to look for more than a 
savings clause and a time frame for implementation and dissolution. 
However, courts in prior cases have specified that such agreements are en-
forceable and allow one party to modify unilaterally without providing notifica-
tion to the other party.130  A unilateral contract, is defined as a one-sided contract 
in regards to amendments and rejections, “often with neither notice to, nor consent 
from, the other party.”131  The Seventh Circuit in Druco, applying Indiana law, 
never addressed whether providing notification would have made the arbitration 
agreement enforceable – the term “notification” is never mentioned in the Seventh 
Circuit’s opinion.132 
Arbitration agreements have been held enforceable when notification was 
given of any changes to the process.133  The Sixth Circuit upheld an arbitration 
clause retaining the right for an employer, on December 31 of every year, to alter 
or terminate the arbitration agreement with a 30-day notice to all employees of the 
change.134  The decision was also further distinguished from other cases because 
the amendment was only allowed on one day during the year.135  However, this 
                                                          
 125. The language in the Druco arbitration clause stated that:  
“[t]he Company reserves the right to institute at any time a system of nonbinding arbitration or 
mediation. Any arbitration under this Agreement shall be held in a forum in the City of Indian-
apolis, State of Indiana. The Franchisee will be obligated to participate in such system, at the 
Company’s request, in the event of a dispute. The Federal Arbitration Act applies to the arbitra-
tion forum clauses contained in this agreement.”  
Druco Rests., Inc. v. Steak N Shake Enters., 765 F.3d 776, 780 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 126. A savings clause is a clause in a legal instrument that states that if some portion of the agreement 
is deemed invalid by a court, “the remaining valid portion will still be enforceable.” See Savings 
Clause, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/saving+clause (last visited May 17, 
2015). See generally Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness, USA, Inc., 669 F.3d 202 (2012); Gonzales v. Brand 
Energy & Infrastructure Servs., No. H-12-1718, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39635 (2013). 
 127. In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, at 569-70 (Tex. 2002); See also Illusory Agreement, 67-
Oct DISP. RESOL. J. 91 (2012). It is important to note that these rules apply arbitration clauses in em-
ployer handbooks; however, it is reasonable to believe that this would be the same policy adopted for 
franchise-franchisee agreements. 
 128. Druco, 765 F.3d at 782. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Floss v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 131. DeMichele & Bales, supra note 2, at 64. 
 132. See generally Druco, 765 F.3d 776. 
 133. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. 317 F.3d 667, 668 (6th Cir. 2003). It is important to note 
that while the issues governing at-will employment are different than franchise agreements, the notice 
requirement for arbitration is still going to be the same requirement. 
 134. Id. at 646, 656. 
 135. Id. 
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was just one factor out of many that the Sixth Circuit considered during the 
case.136 
In states that require a “mutuality of obligation,” courts will be hard pressed 
to ever uphold a clause reserving the right to later implement an arbitration policy 
because there is no consideration for a unilateral right to implement, making it an 
illusory promise.137  This would seem to be the case, even when notification is 
provided.  However, in Ohio, a state that requires mutuality of obligation, a modi-
fication to the contract for an arbitration clause can be deemed a binding obliga-
tion to both sides only when there is notification and time passes before the 
change takes place.138  The court used the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as 
its guide for its decision, as the Restatement allows a 30-day notice provision in a 
contract to suffice for consideration.139 
It would be beneficial for employers and employees alike if the Supreme 
Court would require a notification of a change to an arbitration agreement, to pre-
vent the agreements from being illusory.  Although the Supreme Court could 
promulgate this requirement, states are still going to be required to apply state law 
when determining the enforceability of arbitration clauses.  This state law pro-
vides for much of the federal circuit split on this issue. 
Based on the opinion in Druco and cases from other districts mentioned 
above, the safest way for corporations, in both franchise and employer situations, 
to include arbitration clauses would be to state that the clause is only implemented 
with a 30-day notification.  In addition, the clause should provide the exact lan-
guage of the arbitration agreement that would be implemented.  The language 
would also need to include some guarantee that the implementation of the clause 
would not have retroactive effects. 
From an employee standpoint, having a 30-day notification would ensure ar-
bitration did not catch employees by surprise.  Disallowing retroactive effects 
would prevent situations where a corporation wants to use arbitration for an al-
ready binding contract.  Striking this balance between concepts that favor the 
corporation and the employee helps to get “the best of both world”140 for both 
parties. 
However, in a world where corporations have a large amount of power over 
their employees, the ideal method would be to have a method that favors employ-
ees over employers.  In this, it would be ideal for courts to say that there is no 
consideration even when a 30-day, or longer, notification is given.  Doing this 
would require corporations to include the specific language in the employee 
agreement contracts for the arbitration requirement and only allow them to amend 
the contract if there is adequate consideration. 
                                                          
 136. Id. at 668. The court also considered five factors for whether the plaintiff/employee had “know-
ingly and voluntarily” agreed to the contract: 
“(1) plaintiff’s experience, background, and education; (2) the amount of time the plaintiff had to 
consider whether to sign the waiver, including whether the employee had an opportunity to con-
sult with a lawyer; (3) the clarity of the waiver; (4) consideration for the waiver; as well as (5) 
the totality of the circumstances.”  
Id. (citations omitted). 
 137. DeMichele & Bales, supra note 2, at 69. 
 138. See Morrison, 317 F.3d at 668. 
 139. Id. 
 140. HANNAH MONTANA, THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS (Walt Disney 2005). 
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Ultimately, it would be the best compromise to require a minimum 30-day 
notification for any person to have the right to amend an arbitration clause.  
Therefore, it is likely that the Supreme Court would uphold this requirement in 
order to protect the party with less power. 
B. Nonbinding Arbitration 
In Druco, the Seventh Circuit did not address whether nonbinding arbitration 
fits under the rules for arbitration under the FAA because it held that the arbitra-
tion clauses in the contract were illusory and unenforceable.141  Although, other 
courts have held that nonbinding arbitration falls within the FAA and can be com-
pelled.142  The Supreme Court has never addressed such an issue, though there are 
cases that are persuasive on this matter.  Cases decided under the New York Arbi-
tration Act would be particularly persuasive to the Supreme Court because the 
FAA was modeled after the New York Act.143  Courts out of New York have 
pointed to the purpose of the arbitration acts – a desire for courts to favor arbitra-
tion agreements in their decisions – and suggest that nonbinding arbitration in no 
way damages this purpose.144 
At initial glance, it seems interesting that courts do not interpret nonbinding 
arbitration clauses in a different manner than binding arbitration, even though the 
two types of arbitration have different end results.  In binding arbitration, the 
complaining party has no remedy if the court upholds the arbitration clause.  In 
nonbinding arbitration, parties are free to appeal the arbitrator’s decision in the 
district court as permitted by the contract.  Yet, despite the fact that nonbinding 
arbitration does not require the parties to be stuck with that decision, courts still 
show a pattern of holding nonbinding arbitration to be compelled under the 
FAA.145 
Due to the essence of nonbinding arbitration, it would seem logical to give a 
different standard to nonbinding arbitration, despite FAA standards.  The essence 
of this type of arbitration is to give the parties an idea of what litigation would 
entail and hopefully reach an agreement the two parties would be happy with.  If 
the parties are unhappy, they are free to take the issue to court.  By requiring par-
                                                          
 141. Druco Rests., Inc. v. Steak N Shake Enters., 765 F.3d 776, 784-85 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 142. See Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 1998); AMF, Inc. v. Brunswick 
Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); American Italian Pasta Co. v. Austin Co., 914 F.2d 1103 
(8th Cir. 1990). 
 143. It should be noted that the persuasiveness of legislative history is going to be more accepted by 
Justices who identify as Purposivists, believing that legislative history is indicative of the legislatures 
purpose. If the Justices identify as Textualists, they will be inclined to use the legislative history only if 
the words are ambiguous or it supports their interpretation of the plain meaning of the Act. ESKRIDGE, 
supra note 92, at 135-252. 
 144. See Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Cracovia, 36 A.D.2d 851 (N.Y. 1971). (“‘A written 
agreement to submit any controversy ... is enforceable without regard to the justiciable character of the 
controversy.’ We can see no compelling reason why article 75 of the CPLR should not be applicable to 
‘advisory arbitration’ if that is what the parties intended. Arbitration is a creature of contract and its 
scope can be very broad or very narrow, depending on the provisions of the contract. At bar, the parties 
have agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration although additionally agreeing to limit the impact of 
the arbitrator’s award to that of merely an advisory nature in some instances.”) (citations omitted). 
 145. AMF Inc., 621 F.Supp. at 461 (holding that the court could compel parties to non-binding arbi-
tration under the FAA); Kelley v. Benchmark Homes, Inc., 250 Neb. 367 (1996) (Holding that the 
FAA applies to nonbinding arbitration); Cracovia, 36 A.D. 2d at 851. (holding that a court can compel 
non-binding arbitration). 
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ties to participate in non-binding arbitration, it almost seems that the courts are 
attempting to prevent the matter from going to trial.  Arbitration takes time and 
money, especially when one party has what seems like infinite resources and 
funds.  The court is making these parties spend twice as much money by requiring 
the less powerful party to go through arbitration and then litigation if they are 
ultimately unhappy with the arbitration results. 
Because courts do not differentiate between nonbinding and binding arbitra-
tion in determining whether an arbitration agreement exists, sophisticated parties 
must plainly write what they desire in a contract.  Requiring consideration on both 
sides of the contract, however, can help protect unsophisticated parties from so-
phisticated parties, particularly in employee-employer relationships, where the 
employee has significantly less power in negotiating.  This ultimately represents 
the best compromise for both the franchise and franchisee, or employer and em-
ployee, because it ensures that the parties are specific in their contracting. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Druco represents another example of federal circuit courts not enforcing an 
arbitration agreement due to it being unconscionable and illusory.  This is due in 
part to the FAA’s requirement to analyze contract language regarding arbitration 
under applicable state law, which results in every district coming to different re-
sults while using the same analysis.146  Because of the intricacies of contract law 
in each individual state, the Supreme Court will likely never be able to set a blan-
ket rule, but the Court could still provide a road map for the district and state 
courts that would allow some consistency for parties to have a better understand-
ing. 
The logical solution for this would be to require a 30-day notification in re-
gards to retaining the right to insert an arbitration clause, as this deals directly 
with the conscionability and unilateral right to amendment.  This gives franchisors 
the right to still maintain control over the party, while protecting those that do not 
necessarily have the power to protect themselves.  When looking at non-binding 
arbitration, it is unnecessary to treat it the same as binding arbitration.  Doing so 
just costs the parties more money and time, which will often be a detriment to the 
party with less power. 
As arbitration provisions grow in popularity, issues such as notification, illu-
sory agreements, and the binding authority of arbitration are going to continue to 
become more relevant.  At some point, it is going to be necessary for the Supreme 
Court to take a case on a similar issue in order to provide a clear guide to other 
courts as well as the parties involved in contracting. 
                                                          
 146. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). This concept is also stated in 
section 2 of the FAA, which expressly states that the basis for the enforcement or revocation of arbitra-
tion agreements shall come from state contract law. DeMichele & Bales, supra note 2, at 67. 
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